Regional development & National stability

by C. M. Madduma Bandara

(February 12, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian)
At a time when an element of consensus appears to be emerging regarding the necessity of a National form of Governance, there is a challenge to envision a fresh foundation for an enduring peace and development, than on concentrating energies on reconditioning of what has been already attempted. Understandably, the prevailing political culture and its inherent constraints encourage only paths of least resistance and short-sighted political expediency that compels policy makers to preoccupy themselves with searches for "compromise solutions" to please extreme pressure groups, than with "rational solutions" for the good of the country from a long-term perspective.

Under a national form of governance, that requires far-sighted national thinking, time will soon come to take a long and hard look at the future of this land beyond parochial and sectarian interests.

The great Chinese leader Mao se Dong once expressed his desire to ‘erase all old lines from the Map of China and draw new ones on it’, more in a metaphorical than in a literal sense. For Sri Lanka, the imprint of colonial lines on her Map are so evident, it may be argued that it is already overdue or at least the time had come to draw a new map of Sri Lanka, both in a literal as well as in a metaphorical sense. This is clearly seen in the case of present Provincial boundaries drawn as far back as 1889 by the colonial rulers of the time. These are the same regional units into which current proposals for constitutional reform intend to devolve power.

The prevailing provincial structure

As widely known, the prevailing administrative structure of the Nine Provinces is a creation of the British Colonial rule introduced around 1889 that since then remained in place without substantial change (Fig.1). The National Independence of 1948 provided an historic opportunity for a change in the system, but for some reason or another it did not cross the minds of our political leaders. With a highly centralized administration in Colombo, perhaps Provinces were not all that significant as regional units until recently.

The present structure of the nine provinces was in fact the culmination of a process of restructuring provincial administration by the British colonial government since their conquest of Kandy in 1815, and the establishment of colonial rule proper, with all its might after the 1818 rebellion. The evil intentions of the early colonial rulers with regard to the creation of a provincial system is amply demonstrated by the set-up created in 1832 with five provinces, namely the West, East, North, South and the Central (Fig.2). The Central Province was made the smallest with the declared intention of penalizing and keeping an eye on the Kandyans for resisting the colonial rule (Kodikara, 1993). The present North Central Province including Anuradhapura was placed largely within the Northern Province, making villagers of Nuwarakalaviya that historically formed an essential part of the Kandyan Kingdom, to trek to Jaffna for their administrative requirements. The Eastern Province of that time included a large land area of the interior including Wellassa, Bintenna and Tamankaduwa, with a majority of Sinhala villages. Of these, Uva and North Central Provinces that openly revolted against the British were condemned to remain neglected as the most backward and under-developed parts of the country even after Independence. On the other hand, the geographical and other forms of favouritism shown towards the northern Tamil minority in lieu of their loyalty, culminated in their demand for 50% of the power (‘fifty-fifty’) at the time of Independence.

If not for colonial interventions, in a small country like Sri Lanka, smaller than Scotland (UK), Tasmania (Australia) or Hokkaido (Japan), or even the northern Island of New Zealand, how can one explain the existence of four land-locked provinces out of a total of nine? Thus Central, North Central, Sabaragamuwa and Uva Provinces that formed the core of the Kandyan Kingdom, have no access to the vast ocean surrounding the Island and its resources even after five decades of Independence; perhaps because, under a unitary and centralized form of Government, the impact of land-lockedness was not so seriously felt.

The colonial demarcations have also contributed to the division of the same people into unnecessary groupings such as ‘up-country and low-country’ - a division that did not exist before the arrival of the Portuguese. It only helped the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the crafty colonial mandarins. The implementation of the proposed constitutional reforms will only facilitate the perpetuation of this unholy colonial legacy, denying the free use of the coast line and marine resources by those four provinces in the interior. Before the arrival of the British, Portuguese first and then the Dutch controlled the maritime areas and the land they occupied gradually became established as Maritime Provinces. The Kandyan Kingdom or the ‘Sinhale’ as it was called until recently, was surrounded by these aggressive intruders who started in a small way but gradually expanded land-wards. Therefore, the origin of elongated and belt like Provinces along the coast, reflect only the colonial interests and not that of the indigenous people, whatever the ethnic group they belonged to.

Need for redefining the provinces

It is now widely believed that one of the most practical options towards a political solution to the current national instability would be found in a regional sharing of power. The past attempts in this direction by different regimes as reflected in District level decentralizations, District Development Councils, Provincial Councils and now the proposed Regional Councils, bear ample testimony to this belief. This paper is based on the premise that, there appears hardly any other viable alternative than regionalism within a unitary state with effective safeguards against any form of future disintegration. It believes in the creation of a network of development regions based not on ethnic lines, but on our resource base and the devolution of power required only for satisfying the regional development needs. It therefore, emphasizes the need for development and decentralization than any devolution of power per se.

The path for devolution of power on a regional basis, provide a unique opportunity in the history of Sri Lanka to re-establish a rational regional framework in place of the colonial Provincial structure established over a century ago, to satisfy the strategic and exploitative needs of an alien maritime power. It is these colonial outfits that form the basis of provincial governance today, and sadly it is virtually to the same units with little adjustments that the current constitutional proposals plan to devolve more power. If rational thinking prevails, there is a real challenge as to how best such regions could be defined on a sound and reasonable basis upholding the principles of territorial justice, resource equity and the development potential. The argument advanced here is that, both colonially defined provinces as well as those that are now proposed along ethnic lines, are not only irrational and unreasonable but are likely to create more problems than what they expect to resolve.

As at present, among the major ethnic groups inhabiting the Island, thinking still appears to be highly polarized, inter alia, in respect of the proposed units of devolution. At one extreme, the opinion that the entire area of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as defined during the colonial period, are historical habitations and therefore should contiguously form the exclusive homeland of one ethnic group — namely the Tamils (Vaddukodai Resolution, 1971), remains deeply entrenched particularly among the rebels. On the other hand, the predominant Sinhalese perception (Sinhala Commission Report, 1998) that, the concept of traditional homelands is not only a historical myth but also an aggressive and unfair notion that claims nearly one-third of the total land area and two-third of the coast line of the Island for the exclusive benefit of a disproportionately small share of the population resident in the area, while they also have the freedom to live and work in other parts of the country, remains equally strong and uncompromising.

On top of this highly polarized situation, the initial devolution proposals envisaged the creation of a ‘Muslim unit’ in the Southeast and a ‘tamil unit’ in the Northeast, with some circumcision but based primarily on existing provincial and district boundaries. The main issue here is the use of ethnic criteria as a basis for regional demarcation for sharing of power, without adequately realizing its potential dangers. It underrates possible claims for extrapolation of the same principle to other areas such as the plantations, where Tamils of Indian origin are heavily concentrated and to those numerous scattered localities where Muslims predominate.

The dangers of further intensification of the inhuman process of the so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ as already taking place, and tendencies of some minority groups to identify and affiliate with similar ethnic and religious groups in neighbouring nations, possibly leading ultimately not only to a division of a country smaller than Scotland into pieces, but also to an spreading of the conflict to regional proportions, have also been glossed over for sheer political expediency. The use of ethnic criteria for regional demarcation, also underrates the possible fate of Tamils and Muslims living outside such proposed ‘ethnic enclaves’ as well as the Sinhalas and others who happen to fall inside them. It not only threatens the fundamental right of a Sri Lankan citizen irrespective of his ethnicity, for the freedom to live and earn his living in any part of the country, but also may seriously affect the economy, territorial integrity and long-term national security of the Island.