"The political package will be scanned eagerly today. Mr Rajapakse's first proposal of May 2007 on devolution was district level and within a unitary system. It was laughable. Scant international pressure was put on the Government to produce a devolution package." by Gen. Ashok Kumar Mehta
(January 23, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The savage Tiger attacks against civilian targets in the southern heartland this month mark a new low in the bloody war in Sri Lanka. The abrogation of the six-year-long Cease Fire Agreement appears to be the immediate provocation for the LTTE to switch from military to civilian targets. Year 2007 was not only the most violent, but it also witnessed the ascendancy of nationalism. Anyone talking of peace and negotiation is being called 'unpatriotic' and 'traitor'. The All-Party Representative Committee, which conspicuously excludes the Tamil National Alliance and is boycotted by the United National Party and the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna, will submit its recommendations for the devolution to the Tamils to President Mahinda Rajapakse today.
The scrapping of the CFA is part of a larger politico-military design to dilute the Tamil cause. The de-merger of the North-East, liberation of the East and the lackadaisal approach to political devolution illustrate this. The purely military strategy being pursued now has been tried before. In 1987, security forces were ostensibly poised to crush the Tigers and liberate Jaffna, but India intervened.
After the IPKF withdrawal in 1990, Sri Lanka's Governments alternated between strategies of attrition and territorial control and finally came to accepting the Tigers' domination in the North while retaining the upper hand in the East, which was considered strategically more vital on account of Trincomalee Harbour. The containment strategy was forced as Government did not possess the military capability to fight on two fronts.
In 1995, defence policy underwent a change when the Army captured Jaffna. Encouraged by its historic victory, the Army fell a victim to strategic overreach. This led to a series of debacles ending in the catastrophic defeat at Elephant Pass in 2000. The hurting stalemate that followed led to the CFA in 2002 acknowledging that a military solution was not feasible.
Over the past two years, the military balance has swung dramatically in Government's favour and defeat of the LTTE has become a prerequisite for the political solution. Militaries the world over advocate that security forces can merely create conditions conducive for a political solution. In Sri Lanka, the defence establishment has convinced itself that it can win the war and has declared 2008 as the year of the end of terrorism.
Security forces have reason to be confident. The defence establishment and the military campaign are spearheaded by Mr Rajapakse's brother, Col Gothabaya. In the past 18 months, they have notched up notable battlefield successes by engineering splits within the LTTE and its breakaway faction and an enhanced intelligence network. Thanks to incentives and a modernisation drive, the morale of security forces has never been higher. They enjoy what soldiers yearn for: Clear mission, adequate resources and coordinated political and military guidance. The Air Force and the Navy have succeeded in crippling the LTTE replenishment chain on sea and land and targeting the leadership.
The LTTE is short in numbers and munitions, especially artillery and anti aircraft weapons. Till 2001, the Tigers had a couple of Sam 7 anti-aircraft missiles; but now they are completely defenceless against the daily onslaught of Israeli Kfirs and MiG 27 fighters. Lankan fighter pilots have increased accuracy of attacks due to the precision-bombing techniques taught to them by the Pakistan Air Force. The Air Force's bombing campaign is aimed at getting V Prabhakaran who it claimed was wounded during a raid in November last year. The four aircraft Tamil Eelam Air Force is the Tigers' strategic weapon and could be used on a one way mission to stunning effect.
The ground offensive, now in its fifth month, is being fought on three fronts: Mannar, Vavuniya-Mullaithivu and Jaffna. The Tigers' main bases in the Wanni have been surrounded from all directions. The strategy is both territorial and punitive: Killing 10 Tigers a day. Already this year, the Government has claimed that more than 435 Tigers have been killed for the loss of 35 soldiers securing an astonishing attrition rate of 1:20. The maximum the Indian Army has achieved in Jammu & Kashmir is 1:8.
Fighting is of three types: Conventional set piece battles in the North, guerrilla warfare in the East and terrorism in the South. Such versatility in war fighting is the unique hallmark of the LTTE. The FBI has described the Tigers as the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfit in the world. The Tigers are pioneers in suicide attacks on land and sea and innovators of the human belt bomber. It is the only non-state military with a tri-service capability supported by an elaborate logistics and funding network.
The ground situation is fluid. Despite mounting Government successes, the offensive can only weaken the LTTE, not defeat it or its cause. Except for the high-security zone in Jaffna -- Palaly Airfield and Kanakesanthurai harbour -- the rest of Jaffna peninsula and Wanni are Tiger strongholds. Dislodging the Tigers will not be easy. Intensified operations will only increase collateral damage, flow of refugees and internally displaced people and human rights violations by both sides. Mr Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, on a recent visit to embattled Jaffna, moved by the appalling state of human rights, wrote: "The only thing we can do is cry."
The Tigers may draw the Army into unfamiliar Wanni jungle terrain into a long-drawn guerrilla campaign. The LTTE is attempting to shift the centre of gravity from the fixed battles in Wanni to attacking soft targets in Colombo and the Sinhala heartland, hoping to relieve some pressure in the North. Already on a one-year extension for being the winning General, Army Commander Gen Sarath Fonseka has boasted that he will not hand over the terrorist problem to his successor.
Annulling the CFA amounts to playing into the hands of the Sinhala chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. Noted Sri Lanka scholar Michael Roberts has described the current situation as 'Split Asunder: Citadel Colombo versus Bunker Mullaithivu'.
The political package will be scanned eagerly today. Mr Rajapakse's first proposal of May 2007 on devolution was district level and within a unitary system. It was laughable. Scant international pressure was put on the Government to produce a devolution package. On the contrary, this has encouraged the Government towards a military solution. While the international community has expressed regret and disappointment about abrogation of CFA, India has merely said it does not favour a military solution. It has, in fact, endorsed the fight against terrorism.
In 1987, India sent in the IPKF to prevent a military solution. Twenty years later, it has virtually endorsed it.
(January 23, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The savage Tiger attacks against civilian targets in the southern heartland this month mark a new low in the bloody war in Sri Lanka. The abrogation of the six-year-long Cease Fire Agreement appears to be the immediate provocation for the LTTE to switch from military to civilian targets. Year 2007 was not only the most violent, but it also witnessed the ascendancy of nationalism. Anyone talking of peace and negotiation is being called 'unpatriotic' and 'traitor'. The All-Party Representative Committee, which conspicuously excludes the Tamil National Alliance and is boycotted by the United National Party and the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna, will submit its recommendations for the devolution to the Tamils to President Mahinda Rajapakse today.
The scrapping of the CFA is part of a larger politico-military design to dilute the Tamil cause. The de-merger of the North-East, liberation of the East and the lackadaisal approach to political devolution illustrate this. The purely military strategy being pursued now has been tried before. In 1987, security forces were ostensibly poised to crush the Tigers and liberate Jaffna, but India intervened.
After the IPKF withdrawal in 1990, Sri Lanka's Governments alternated between strategies of attrition and territorial control and finally came to accepting the Tigers' domination in the North while retaining the upper hand in the East, which was considered strategically more vital on account of Trincomalee Harbour. The containment strategy was forced as Government did not possess the military capability to fight on two fronts.
In 1995, defence policy underwent a change when the Army captured Jaffna. Encouraged by its historic victory, the Army fell a victim to strategic overreach. This led to a series of debacles ending in the catastrophic defeat at Elephant Pass in 2000. The hurting stalemate that followed led to the CFA in 2002 acknowledging that a military solution was not feasible.
Over the past two years, the military balance has swung dramatically in Government's favour and defeat of the LTTE has become a prerequisite for the political solution. Militaries the world over advocate that security forces can merely create conditions conducive for a political solution. In Sri Lanka, the defence establishment has convinced itself that it can win the war and has declared 2008 as the year of the end of terrorism.
Security forces have reason to be confident. The defence establishment and the military campaign are spearheaded by Mr Rajapakse's brother, Col Gothabaya. In the past 18 months, they have notched up notable battlefield successes by engineering splits within the LTTE and its breakaway faction and an enhanced intelligence network. Thanks to incentives and a modernisation drive, the morale of security forces has never been higher. They enjoy what soldiers yearn for: Clear mission, adequate resources and coordinated political and military guidance. The Air Force and the Navy have succeeded in crippling the LTTE replenishment chain on sea and land and targeting the leadership.
The LTTE is short in numbers and munitions, especially artillery and anti aircraft weapons. Till 2001, the Tigers had a couple of Sam 7 anti-aircraft missiles; but now they are completely defenceless against the daily onslaught of Israeli Kfirs and MiG 27 fighters. Lankan fighter pilots have increased accuracy of attacks due to the precision-bombing techniques taught to them by the Pakistan Air Force. The Air Force's bombing campaign is aimed at getting V Prabhakaran who it claimed was wounded during a raid in November last year. The four aircraft Tamil Eelam Air Force is the Tigers' strategic weapon and could be used on a one way mission to stunning effect.
The ground offensive, now in its fifth month, is being fought on three fronts: Mannar, Vavuniya-Mullaithivu and Jaffna. The Tigers' main bases in the Wanni have been surrounded from all directions. The strategy is both territorial and punitive: Killing 10 Tigers a day. Already this year, the Government has claimed that more than 435 Tigers have been killed for the loss of 35 soldiers securing an astonishing attrition rate of 1:20. The maximum the Indian Army has achieved in Jammu & Kashmir is 1:8.
Fighting is of three types: Conventional set piece battles in the North, guerrilla warfare in the East and terrorism in the South. Such versatility in war fighting is the unique hallmark of the LTTE. The FBI has described the Tigers as the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfit in the world. The Tigers are pioneers in suicide attacks on land and sea and innovators of the human belt bomber. It is the only non-state military with a tri-service capability supported by an elaborate logistics and funding network.
The ground situation is fluid. Despite mounting Government successes, the offensive can only weaken the LTTE, not defeat it or its cause. Except for the high-security zone in Jaffna -- Palaly Airfield and Kanakesanthurai harbour -- the rest of Jaffna peninsula and Wanni are Tiger strongholds. Dislodging the Tigers will not be easy. Intensified operations will only increase collateral damage, flow of refugees and internally displaced people and human rights violations by both sides. Mr Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, on a recent visit to embattled Jaffna, moved by the appalling state of human rights, wrote: "The only thing we can do is cry."
The Tigers may draw the Army into unfamiliar Wanni jungle terrain into a long-drawn guerrilla campaign. The LTTE is attempting to shift the centre of gravity from the fixed battles in Wanni to attacking soft targets in Colombo and the Sinhala heartland, hoping to relieve some pressure in the North. Already on a one-year extension for being the winning General, Army Commander Gen Sarath Fonseka has boasted that he will not hand over the terrorist problem to his successor.
Annulling the CFA amounts to playing into the hands of the Sinhala chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. Noted Sri Lanka scholar Michael Roberts has described the current situation as 'Split Asunder: Citadel Colombo versus Bunker Mullaithivu'.
The political package will be scanned eagerly today. Mr Rajapakse's first proposal of May 2007 on devolution was district level and within a unitary system. It was laughable. Scant international pressure was put on the Government to produce a devolution package. On the contrary, this has encouraged the Government towards a military solution. While the international community has expressed regret and disappointment about abrogation of CFA, India has merely said it does not favour a military solution. It has, in fact, endorsed the fight against terrorism.
In 1987, India sent in the IPKF to prevent a military solution. Twenty years later, it has virtually endorsed it.
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